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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

The petitioner Joann Russell-Smith ("Russell-Smith") and her husband acquired a certificate for water rights for domestic use on two adjoining properties called lots 4 and 5. Russell-Smith lived on lot 4 and
rented lot 5 to others. The certificate authorized diversion of water
from an "unnamed spring" and identified a particular point of diversion ("POD") where the certificate authorized the owner to take water
from that source. From 1977 to the present, the various owners of the
two properties captured water at the authorized POD in a collection
box. Overflow from the collection box, as well as water flowing from
the unnamed spring near the collection box, flowed into an intermittent stream that ran near lot 5. Renters, and later owners, of lot 5 used
the water from the intermittent stream. In early April 1996, the present owners of lot 4 filed documents with the Water Resources Department claiming statutory nonuse of the water from the intermittent
stream. The owners asked for a cancellation of that portion of the old
water right appurtenant to lot 5. The present owners claimed that because use of the water was from a place other than the described POD
in the certificate, it met the statutory definition of nonuse.
The main issue was whether a holder of a water right, who takes
water from the authorized source but does so from an unauthorized
POD has failed to use all or part of the water appropriated, thus, triggering forfeiture of the water right. The court concluded that if, as
here, a certificate holder makes an unauthorized change of POD, but
continues to use water from a designated source in a designated
amount and for the designated use, there is no "failure to use" within
the meaning of the statute.
The court reasoned that although there are special rules that a water user must follow when the user changes the POD, the key issue in
forfeiture for non-use is use, and not whether the user failed to comply
with statutory procedures for changing the POD. Oregon's water law
treats "use," "beneficial use," and "point of diversion" as distinct concepts. The statute in question focuses on "use" and "beneficial use,"
and makes no reference to "point of diversion." Although other statutes do speak to unauthorized changes in point of diversion, none refer to forfeiture as a consequence or remedy.
Moreover, nothing suggests that the legislature, in enacting the
forfeiture statute, intended an unauthorized change in POD to give
rise to forfeiture.
Joseph A. Dawson

VIRGINIA
Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 500 S.E.2d 503 (Va. 1998) (holding
that food company failed to demonstrate ajusticiable controversy with
respect to modification of a state pollution discharge permit).

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Smithfield Foods owned subsidiary corporations that operated two
pork processing plants in Isle of Wight County. In 1986, the State Water Control Board (the "Board"), through the Commonwealth of Virginia, issued a permit that regulated the wastewater Smithfield discharged into the Pagan River. The Board later modified the permit,
adding a compliance schedule for the construction of facilities that
would meet a monthly average effluent limitation of phosphorous and
limited nitrogen. Smithfield appealed the modification, challenging
the phosphorous standards that were set forth by the Board.
In 1991, a special order was issued in which Smithfield agreed to
dismiss its appeal and to decide within a specified time if it would
comply with the permit. Smithfield agreed one month later to connect its wastewater plants to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District
wastewater plant. In 1992, a new permit was issued with the same
phosphorous levels.
In 1996, the Board filed a complaint alleging that Smithfield
committed numerous permit violations and violated the special order.
The EPA then filed suit against Smithfield in the U.S. District Court
seeking penalties under the Clean Water Act for violations of certain
effluent standards, including phosphorous and TRN standards in the
1992 permit. Smithfield filed a cross-bill seeking declaratory judgment
that the special order revised, superseded, and replaced the earlier
permit.
The Chancellor issued the declaratory judgment that the phosphorous standards were inconsistent with the special order. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that there was no controversy at issue
because they had agreed that the special order precedes the permits.
Smithfield however, argued that there was a controversy because the
special order was a contract with the Commonwealth which the Commonwealth breached by issuing the 1992 permit.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that Smithfield was not entitled
to a declaratory judgment because it failed to demonstrate ajusticiable
controversy. The court found that to be justiciable a controversy must
involve specific adverse claims that are based on present, not future or
speculative, facts that are ripe for justiciable assessment. Thus, the
trial court did not have authority to issue an advisory opinion or answer speculative inquiries. No controversy existed with the Commonwealth because they agreed on the importance of the special order.
Rather, the controversy was with the EPA in the federal case against
Smithfield and it should have been pursued it that forum.
Elise S. Wald

WASHINGTON
Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877 (Wash. 1998) (affirming a lower court
decision which held Defendants liable for breach of a farm lease and

